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Abstract
This article is an analysis of a controversial policy decision on the part of the newly
elected Democratic Alliance local administration in Cape Town, South Africa, to fire
senior officials of the previous African National Congress administration and to
introduce an interim policy for senior managers that stated that such positions should
be filled by people who are ‘politically suitable and acceptable’ to the ruling party.
The author of this article was part of a team that reviewed this policy. This article is an
account of this process.
The author developed, on the basis of comparative experience, a heuristic model
that could serve as the basis for gauging the extent of politicians’ involvement in the
appointment of staff. A continuum illustrating the different approaches to council
appointment of staff was generated. Five different approaches were identified, namely
neutral, minimalist appointment of senior staff, appointment of top and middle-level
staff, large-scale appointment in all ranks and fusion of party/state. The report
concluded that the most appropriate of these models is the minimalist appointment
model whereby councillors should have the right to appoint certain selected senior
staff.
Introduction
Defining politics–administration relationships has been a constant debate
amongst administrative theorists since the days of Woodrow Wilson. This article
is an analysis of a controversial policy decision on the part of the newly elected
Democratic Alliance (DA) local administration in Cape Town, South Africa. One
of the first steps that the administration took was to fire senior officials of the 
previous African National Congress (ANC) administration and to introduce an
interim policy for senior managers that stated that such positions should be filled
by people who are ‘politically suitable and acceptable’ to the ruling party.
The author of this article was part of that policy process. He was contracted by
the City of Cape Town as a consultant first to write a paper looking at inter-
national best practice in this regard and second, to chair a committee that
reviewed the policy as a whole. This article is an account of the process. It begins
with a discussion of the changing local government context in South Africa. This
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is followed by an examination of this controversial appointments policy of the
City of Cape Town. An analysis is undertaken of the theoretical and comparative
literature on politics–administrative relationships. A heuristic model was devel-
oped in this regard to guide the review of the policy. The final part looks at the
policy recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry which led to a change in
policy.
History of local government in South Africa
Prior to 1994, South African local government was structured on racial grounds,
although only white municipalities were proper, functioning entities with suffi-
cient sources of revenue. South Africa had inherited the English system of local
government. Under this system the Town Clerk was the Head of the Administra-
tion and other heads of departments, depending on the size of the town, supported
him/her. They, together with their supporting staff, were supposedly only respon-
sible for the administration and carrying out policy of the Council.
Because councillors were mostly laypersons in municipal affairs, they relied
heavily on the advice and guidance of the Town Clerk and heads of departments.
Officials often played a disproportionate role in policy formulation (Cameron,
1986). The extent of councillor involvement in policy often depended on the 
quality of leadership in council. There was also little party-political affiliation at
local government level (with the notable exception of Johannesburg) (Craythorne,
1990).
Local government transformation process
The 1990s saw the negotiation of a new constitutional system in South Africa at
all three levels of government. An agreement was reached during constitutional
negotiations amongst the major stakeholders, most notably the then ruling party,
the National Party (NP) and the ANC, to restructure and deracialize local govern-
ment in three phases:
• Pre-interim phase. This phase covered the period from the passing of the
restructuring legislation in February 1994 until the first local government elec-
tions held in 1995/6.
• Interim phase. This phase started with the first local government elections
and ended with the implementation of the final constitutional model of local
government in 1997 (although power-sharing arrangements remained in effect
until 2000).
• Final phase. This phase began with the final constitutional model of local
government in 1997, although some of the constitutional provisions only took
effect after the 2000 local government elections (Cloete, 1995).
South Africa’s first democratic local government elections took place in
1995/6. These elections also introduced party politics openly into local govern-
ment. There were caucuses in most municipalities in the country. There were
attempts to increase the policy-making powers and reduce that of officials during
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the interim phase although the power-sharing mechanisms tempered the full
effect of party politics.
A two-tier system of local government was introduced into metropolitan areas.
In the Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA), the wealthiest and most resourced of the
metropolitan local councils, the Central City of Cape Town, was won by the
ANC. Party politics became a dominant feature of the CMA area. In the CMA
elections, only seven independent candidates were elected in the 172 wards.
The final phase of local government made provision for stronger executive
authorities. The key reasons advanced for stronger executive authorities were:
• The ability of mayors to run cities efficiently and innovatively and not be tied
down by bureaucratic red tape. This was of particular significance, given greater
globalization where cities are seen as arenas for economic competition in the
global market place. Executive mayors could play a key role in attracting invest-
ment.
• The need for mayors to be high-profile public figures which should clarify
accountability and heighten interest in civic affairs (Cameron, 2000).
The Municipal Structures Act also made provision for two types of executives in
cities, namely the Mayoral Executive System and the Collective Executive
System, with some executive powers being vested in the Mayor in terms of the
former model and in the Executive Committee in the latter one. It was the respon-
sibility of the Provincial Minister of Local Government to choose the option
his/her party wanted. In the Western Cape the Collective Executive model was
chosen. Although Cape Town does not have an Executive Mayor model, the
Collective Executive system also makes provision for a strong executive
(Republic of South Africa, 1998).
This legislation is in line with global trends in many countries that have moved
towards stronger executives at local government level (Wilson and Game, 1998).
There is now more executive councillor influence in policy formulation and less
ordinary councillor involvement in policy and administration. This has led to gaps
developing between executive councils and ordinary councillors. It also means
that these executive councillors play a much greater role in policy formulation.
Conversely, the policy formation role of officials has been reduced substantially.
Cape Town 2000 — Democratic Alliance control
The Municipal Structures Act made provision for single-tier authorities (mega-
cities) to replace two-tier authorities in metropolitan areas. The newly formed DA
won a comfortable majority of seats on the new uni-city winning 107 of the 200
seats. The DA and ANC won all the wards between them as well as 92 percent of
the seats. Smaller political parties, through proportional representation vote, won
the rest of the seats. The eclipse of independent candidates finally occurred with
not one independent candidate being elected.
With no forced power-sharing mechanisms to facilitate consensus and the final
demise of independents, the full blast of party politics at local government level
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descended upon Cape Town for the first time. The newly elected DA had not only
won control of the new Cape Town unicity; it had also wrestled control of the
crown jewel component of it from the ANC, the erstwhile City of Cape Town.
Not only was it going to implement its electoral mandate, it was also going to
reverse some of the ANC’s local government policy. The first target in this regard
were senior officials of the previous ANC administration.
Democratic Alliance’s appointment policy
The DA came out with a policy approach to political appointments in local 
governments that it controlled on 10 January 2001 (Democratic Alliance, 2001).
This was intended to be an interim policy outlining the reasons why certain posi-
tions in government administrations should be filled by people who are ‘political-
ly suitable and acceptable’ to the ruling party.
The document stressed that the DA believed in a clear separation of party and
state. It stated, however, that there are certain positions in government administra-
tions that are, by definition, politically sensitive and not simply bureaucratic in
nature. These positions tend to exist in two broad fields: strategic management
and communication. In both categories incumbents need to have not only the 
relevant skills and qualifications but also ‘a deep commitment to the policy pro-
gramme of the ruling party’.
The document also argues that a clear, rational and public distinction should
thus be made between positions that simply require appropriate skills and qualifi-
cations. The criteria for posts that require political suitability can be defined as
any post
• which involves the development of government policy at a strategic level
ensuring alignment with party political objectives and programmes;
• which requires the incumbent to be trusted with sensitive and/or confidential
party political information; and
• which requires the incumbent to direct, at a political level, government com-
munication.
The document concludes by stating that because political suitability is necessary
for certain positions, incumbents in these positions should not be employed on the
same terms as ordinary public servants. Rather, they should be employed:
1. on contract, without the benefits of public servants in permanent positions;
2. for a period not exceeding the date of the next election; and
3. only if they are demonstrably qualified in all respects to do the job.
The flip-side of this policy was that senior officials who were not ‘politically
suitable and acceptable’ were unlikely to find senior positions within the new DA
administration. Accordingly, six senior officials — five from the City of Cape
Town, including its Senior Manager and one from Tygerberg — had their con-
tracts terminated by the DA administration after negotiations to find them alterna-
tive positions with the administration broke down.
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This policy was further developed by the then DA adviser, Ryan Coetzee, in an
article in The Argus newspaper on 19 February 2001. He stated:
Political parties are elected on the basis of a manifesto, and are required to implement
their manifesto. In order to do so, the top officials responsible for turning the party’s
policy into government programmes need to support the objectives of the policy, be
trusted with confidential party information, attend party caucuses and be relied upon to
keep the content of discussions that take place at these caucuses confidential.
He went on to say: ‘Similarly, the official in charge of communication needs to
endorse enthusiastically the ruling party’s programme in order to communicate its
implementation convincingly’.
There was a major political reaction to this policy with the ANC, in particular,
being outraged by this decision to terminate the contracts of their erstwhile senior
officials, demanding that they be reinstated. The ability of the DA to implement
this policy was accentuated by the fact that the ANC had declined to accept the
positions on the Executive Committee to which they were legally entitled.
This policy was also attacked in the press on the grounds that it was politicizing
the city administration. Most significantly, it caused strains in the ruling DA
administration. The DA had been formed just before the 2000 municipal elections
and its main constituent elements were the conservative National Party (NP)
(which ruled the country from 1948 until 1994) and the more liberal Democratic
Party (DP). Elements within the old DP were opposed to this perceived politiciza-
tion of the administration, particularly since they were criticizing the ANC at
national level for doing precisely the same thing, namely appointing political sup-
porters to senior government posts.
As a result of the public outcry and the tension within the DA, the author was
commissioned to undertake a comparative analysis of senior staff appointment
policy at local government level. This report undertook an analysis of the theoreti-
cal and comparative politics–administration literature which is discussed here-
under.
Relationship between politics and administration
The classical viewpoint of the relationship between politics and administration is
that of Woodrow Wilson, who argued that there should be a clear distinction
between these two spheres. Politics is concerned with the ‘role of public opinion,
the activities of political parties, the function of legislative bodies . . . the clash of
opinion and the conflict of values’ (Waldo, 1968: 147). Administration was
regarded as the neutral implementation of policy by bureaucrats in a non-partisan,
technical fashion. This is sometimes called the master–servant relationship. At
local government level this would mean that the council issues orders and the 
officers carry them out. The function of policy formulation should be that of the
politician, while policy implementation should be the domain of the administra-
tor. This enables civil servants to be appointed on the basis of merit and not nepo-
tism. One of the defining characteristics of Weber’s model of bureaucracy was
that civil servants should be selected on the basis of merit and competence rather
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than ascriptive criteria such as caste, race, class or language. One of the reasons
for the adoption of merit recruitment in western countries was the desire to
remove the appointment of administrative positions from political patronage
(Peters, 1989: 75–6). The civil services of most western countries are based on
this doctrine, which also underpins the councillor–officer relationship at local
level.
Wilson’s views are sometimes more complex than he is given credit for. He
was concerned with both the corrupting and politicizing interference of party
organizations in administrative affairs and also with the extensive attention by
Congress to administrative matters. When Wilson was suggesting a clear differ-
entiation between politics and administration, he was attempting to strengthen
and redirect the legislative function while protecting the administration from
political interference (see Svara, 1998). It was later writers who introduced this
rigidity between politics and administration.
The most serious criticism of the politics/administration dichotomy came from
Waldo in The Administrative State in 1948. He argued that the emphasis on expert
judgement and scientific knowledge created a government in which the elected
politicians had little role in decision-making. He argued that bureaucrats were
becoming too loyal to the profession rather than the public (cited in Cox et al.,
1994: 9–11).
Waldo introduced the concept of administrative politics. The argument is that 
a rigid distinction cannot be made between public administration and policy-
making or policies. It is advanced that public administration is policy-making
(also see Adamolekun, 1986: 14). This politics–administration distinction has
long been recognized by administrative theorists as an artificial one. Bureaucrats
often have technical expertise and detailed knowledge of their various fields; they
are often more informed than politicians and this gives them the authority to make
detailed policy decisions. A high degree of politicization exists, even in western
countries, in the appointment to higher civil service posts. Bureaucrats often 
pursue their own interests, empire building being a common goal. At local
government level senior officials not only have professional training and experi-
ence; they have a commitment to the service whether it be in health, engineering
or local economic development. They will submit reports and ideas to councillors,
in particular committee chairmen, and in so doing strongly influence policy. In
addition, conversely, elected politicians are often engaged in what would ordi-
narily be described as administration or management (Byrne, 1986: 176–7; Smith,
1988; Wallis, 1989; Harris, 1990).
A study of the then Cape Town City Council in 1986 (Cameron, 1986) revealed
a number of ways that bureaucrats influence policy. First, through their control of
the agenda they can ensure that a number of issues never actually end up on the
agenda; second through the cluttering of the agenda with trivia so it is difficult to
distinguish the wheat from the chaff; and third, they are able to prioritize reports
(depending on whether they want issues to receive urgent attention or die a slow
death).
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Also, the field of implementation studies has shown that bureaucrats can often
alter or even negate the intention of policy-makers when they are implementing
policy.
The tacit refusal to implement a policy or programme is good example. As
Peters (1989: 280) puts it, non-administration is difficult to control. It is consider-
ably harder to get the bureaucracy to do something that it is not (yet should be)
doing than to stop it doing something it should not be doing.
Lipsky (1980) portrays lower-level bureaucrats as street-level bureaucrats and
argues that they make policy carrying out a political role, determining the alloca-
tion of particular goods and services in the society. The important point is that it is
not only senior bureaucrats who make policy.
Finally, the idea of the neutral administration has also been heavily attacked
from the left. Neutral appointees may also be apathetic if not hostile to pro-
grammes. Bureaucrats are seen as a part of the ruling elite class who use their con-
trol over access to these resources to benefit this class generally (Smith, 1988).
Merit appointments do, however, have some disadvantages. Merit appointment
implies a value-free bureaucrat who will administer public policies regardless of
their impact on society. Individuals elected by patronage (spoils system) are more
likely to be disposed towards the programme of a political party in power than the
supposed neutral appointees of a merit system who may be apathetic, if not hostile
to that programme. Peters (1989: 76) suggests that a committed bureaucracy
requires that political appointees be selected for a combination of political dispo-
sition and administrative talent, rather than for political views only.
Having said that, in effect all political systems have some political appoint-
ments (often euphemistically called policy-making positions). In the United
States and several continental European countries there are a large number of
political appointees, while in Britain there are relatively few.
Another issue is whether politics ought to be separated from administration.
The Soviet Union was an example of a local government system which fused 
politics and administration. From at least Khrushchev’s tenure until the late
1980s, there were repeated attempts to decentralize powers to local government.
These failed not only due to the principle of hierarchical subordination but also
fundamentally due to the ‘leading role’ of the party. Local governments were
required to obey both state and party structures at the next hierarchical level.
Elected representatives met rarely and did little other than rubber-stamp deci-
sions of the executive. The executive itself was controlled by the party. Many
senior administrators and a high proportion of elected representatives were party
members. In fact Article 6 of the Constitution guaranteed the party’s leading role.
However, the party line was not necessarily consistent and clear. There was a
high degree of local independence, particularly during the latter days of commu-
nist rule, when local party bosses could pursue their own ideas (Coulson, 1995).
This model of fused politics–administrative relationships took on a particular
form in developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s.
At one time there was a strong belief that civil services in developing countries
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should be politicized. Politicization of the administration operated at two levels:
internally and externally. Internally, the administration became politicized when
recruitment for, and continuance in, positions of responsibility were solely the
preserve of party members. Externally, it occurred when the administrative ser-
vices were unable to act without the consent of the unit representing the party
(Bola-Ntotele, 1986).
While most ex-British colonies adopted their mother country’s form of admin-
istration, they rejected the idea of civil service neutrality. In Francophone Africa,
following the lead of their colonial power, politicized administration was a matter
of course (Subramaniam, 1990: 396).
What were the reasons for this? First, the new ruling parties often found them-
selves with large mass support but poorly integrated mobilization for stable eco-
nomic tasks. They accordingly used every means at their disposal for this purpose,
including the civil service. This was more pronounced in one-party states, where
politics in the sense of policy determination was the business of the party, which
belonged to everyone. The execution of policy by the civil service demanded
mobilization of popular support for the party policy, which was a political func-
tion. This combination of executive skill and support-winning tactics postulated a
simultaneously politicized and skill-based civil service. At the minimum the one-
party state demanded civil service loyalty to the party’s ideology, if not active
support.
Another widely used argument was that of saving talent. The separation of
political and administrative offices assumed the availability of educated and 
talented people to fill both offices. It was argued that because trained manpower
of both types is in short supply in Africa, complete transferability between both
types of offices seemed desirable and possible. It was also held that participation
in politics reduced the opportunities of civil servants to sabotage these politics.
Participation in politics increased policy acceptance. This fusion of policy and
administration occurred at both central and local level in a number of countries,
including Tanzania and Zambia (Subramaniam, 1977, 1990; Mphaisha, 2000).
While this final model recognized that the politics–administration distinction
was obsolete and that administrations are inevitably partially politicized, this was
no justification for introducing a totally politicized civil service. The African
experience has shown that bureaucratic corruption and maladministration results
from the fusion of politics and politicization of administrative systems. First, the
exercise of political control over the administration restricted the selection base of
candidates, since only party members or their nominees were put up for recruit-
ment. This reduced the chances of building up a skilled staff of administrators
loyal to the department. This led to accountability to political leaders rather than
to the general public. Activities that promoted the welfare of the population were
relegated to secondary concerns. In order to gain approval of superiors, public 
servants often glossed over or ignored any reference to real problems and the con-
cerns and needs of clientele.
Second, the effects of this politicization on the population were that it acted as
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an incentive to support the dominant party. It relegated a section of the population
to a marginal role. Non-party members with no personal influence found it diffi-
cult to get access to public administration; more importantly, they were excluded
from positions of responsibility (Bola-Ntotele, 1986).
Models of politics–administration relationships
What specific lessons were there from the international literature for the City of
Cape Town? First, any attempts to introduce a policy based on a rigid politics–
administration distinction would be conceptually unsound and naïvely presume
that officials play no role in politics, and could well cause policy problems for
politicians at a later stage. Having said that any attempt to fuse politics and admin-
istration through having a totally politicized administration would lead to bureau-
cratic corruption and maladministration. The question then was to try to find some
middle ground between these two positions.
The report attempted, on the basis of comparative experience, to develop a
heuristic model that could serve as the basis for gauging the extent of politicians’
involvement in the appointment of staff (Cameron, 2001; see Figure 1).
In the figure, a continuum illustrating the different approaches to council
appointment of staff was developed. On the one end of the continuum is the 
neutral model. This reflects the artificial politics–administration distinction by
assuming that senior staff are non-partisan and not involved in policy. An exam-
ple of this model would be a traditional British local government model (which is
slowly being eroded). Senior staff are being appointed by government at both
national and local levels (Halligan, 1997).
The next model is mayor/council appointment of senior staff, namely the mini-
malist appointment model. A new council may feel that senior staff were too
closely associated with the previous order and need to be replaced by officials it
can trust. This model is typically found in many Western European countries such
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as France and Germany, parts of the United States and even now in Britain
(Gunlicks, 1986; Keating and Hainsworth, 1986; Norton, 1986; John and Cole,
1999).
The third model is mayor/council appointment of both senior and middle-
ranking staff, viz. the medium patronage model. This would be the Latin
American model where not only are senior staff replaced, but so are middle 
management such as divisional heads. As opposed to the minimalist council
appointment model that would typically consist of the replacement of 6–12 senior
staff, the council appointment of senior and middle-ranking staff could involve
around 5 percent of total staff. There is much patronage associated with this
model (Nickson, 1995).
The fourth model is the comprehensive patronage model. When there is a
change of administration, whole-scale purging of the organization occurs from 
the highest to the lowest levels. An example of this was the powers that directly
elected United States mayors had in the 1920s and 1930s to dispense large-scale
patronage by firing officials of the old order and replacing them with their own
employees, as a way of settling favours and promoting new client–local relations
(Svara, 1985).
The final model is the one that can be termed the fused party–state model
whereby the interests of the local government become indistinguishable from that
of the political party. This was found in one-party states such as the Soviet Union
and in some third world countries and typically mean that a large number of staff
would only be employed or promoted if they belonged to and promoted the inter-
ests of the party. The party itself was involved in the recruitment of local govern-
ment staff (Adamolekun, 1986; Coulson, 1995).
The one difference between this model and the patronage one is that the latter 
is based on clientelism and personal networks. The fused party–state model
demands greater ideological purity and loyalty to the state rather than personal
loyalty to an individual mayor. Arguably, in the latter days of soviet rule the fused
party–state resembled the comprehensive patronage model though a network of
powerful mayors. One can still, nevertheless, draw a conceptual distinction
between these two models.
The report concluded that the most appropriate of these models is the minimal-
ist appointment model whereby councillors should have the right to appoint
certain selected staff.
The Committee of Inquiry
This comparative report was favourably received by the Executive Committee
(Exco). It confirmed that there was international precedent for councils to appoint
staff although there was recognition that the Council has blundered in the com-
munication of this policy — in particular the use of the term ‘political suitability
and acceptability’ was considered inappropriate.
The second part of the investigation involved the setting up of a Committee of
Inquiry to review the policy as a whole. An independent review body, which was
60 International Review of Administrative Sciences 69(1)
02_IRAS69/1 articles  6/3/03  2:35 pm  Page 60
 at University of Cape Town on August 31, 2016ras.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
chaired by this author, was set up to recommend whether this interim senior
appointment policy should be maintained, reviewed or rescinded. The Committee
met in April 2001 and interviewed a number of councillors and officials, as well
as representatives of professional local government associations.
The policy question was to what extent should a South African local govern-
ment council be able to replace staff of the old political order and on what basis?
The committee used the Cameron comparative continuum as its starting point
(Commitee of Inquiry, 2001). It recognized that senior officials have important
policy-making and oversight responsibilities that are essential to the strategic
focus of the Council and its Exco. Elected politicians need, therefore, to have the
trust of senior officials whose responsibilities include the strategic planning of
policy and advising Exco on the difficult policy choices available to the Council
in order for it to work harmoniously and efficiently.
This was the principle of democratic, good governance. If the senior officials
do not have the trust and confidence of the elected (majority) of the Council, or
they stand in the way of the programme and mandate of the Council, then the
wishes of the electorate may be defeated or compromised. Put another way, the
elected politicians should have the power over policy — not the officials.
Officials whose philosophical and ideological approach contradicts those of the
politicians may find it impossible to embrace the vision and values of the elected
politicians and may even willingly or unwillingly obstruct.
This was the committee’s first principle of good governance: the Principle of
Confidence.
The Committee examined the comprehensive patronage model and the fused
party–state models and came to the conclusion that it is not in the public interest
for there to be the wholesale sort of purge of personnel that either model contem-
plates. It was felt that it would not suit the political and cultural character of South
Africa, and it would not find much or indeed any support from the citizens of
Cape Town or the personnel elected or employed to serve in its Council.
In particular it breached what was identified as the Principle of Continuity.
Used predominantly to defend notions of a ‘neutral’, ‘professional’ civil service,
continuity in personnel in the civil service allows the ‘show to go on’, detached
from political change arising from electoral upheaval.
The Committee argued that a properly constructed policy, supported by a code
of conduct that has attracted broad cross-party support would, if implemented
properly, help ensure that there is no repetition in the future.
The Committee believed that there was a third starting principle: the Principle
of Competence. By competence it was meant that the individuals appointed to all
positions within the Council must be worthy of the appointment. This ensures that
the element of merit and professionalism is maintained. In other words, no person
who would otherwise not have got the job should be appointed to a senior position
simply because he or she meets the confidence criterion.
The Committee believed that this would help ensure that the question of confi-
dence operates ‘downwards’ as well as ‘upwards’; subordinate members of staff
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are entitled to have confidence in their senior managers. Above all else, officials
should have confidence that senior managers are in position because of their 
abilities and not because they are loyal to the ruling party.
It was argued that there is a hierarchy of principles: the principles of confidence
and competence are absolute, ‘non-negotiable’. The principle of continuity,
though important, may be eclipsed by one or both of the first two principles.
Findings and recommendations
The major findings of the Committee of Inquiry (2001) were:
• The world of local government is changing fundamentally in Cape Town.
Greater party politicization and a move towards stronger executives are redefin-
ing the traditional politics–administration relationship irrevocably. There is a
move towards stronger councillor and less bureaucratic involvement in policy 
formulation, a trend that will accentuate during the next five years.
• Many officials are understandably uneasy and, in some cases, do not fully
comprehend this changing politics–administration relationship which is reducing
their traditional role in policy formulation. However, resistance to change is a 
natural phenomenon in organizations and is something that needs to be managed.
• Notwithstanding this, the Committee felt that the interim policy was ambigu-
ous and led to confusion, insecurity and malaise amongst many officials. Despite
assurances by the acting Municipal Manager to the contrary, there was a wide-
spread perception that political suitability and acceptability would be an over-
riding factor in the determining of positions in the unicity.
• The brief of the Committee was to examine whether the interim appointment
policy should be retained, abolished or modified. The retention option was 
rejected. The Committee found that the current policy was ambiguous, confusing
and had affected staff morale. The impression had been created that party-
political suitability would be the major criterion for a senior position, which was
found unacceptable.
• The abolition option was also rejected. Given the greater party politicization
of local government, the Committee found it naïve to think that politics plays no
role in the bureaucracy. Senior officials contribute to policy and affect the impact
of its implementation.
• The recommended option was that the existing policy be modified and that
each incoming council should have the right to choose certain selected posts.
Beyond the confidence that every employer should have in its employees, the
Committee accepted that in modern government there is a need for the elected
representatives to have full confidence and trust in the senior officials charged
with the responsibility of making policy and advising the elected representatives
on the policy choices they face.
• Defining, in objective terms, the exact nature of these positions was not an
easy undertaking, and while the overwhelming majority of the people the Com-
mittee interviewed agreed with the concept and with the underlying proposition
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that an added component of confidence and trust was needed in these category of
posts, none could offer much help in terms of the precise definition.
• However, while there were differences of emphasis, the following proposi-
tion found favour with the overwhelming number of Exco members and past and
present officials that the Committee talked to: that ordinarily there would be the
positions
(a) where an inherent part of the post-holder’s authority and responsibility
concerns matters of policy-making at the highest level; 
(b) that these are strategically vital for the effective planning and implementa-
tion of the government’s policy mandate; and
(c) that in most cases this will be the senior line function position/head of
department, where there is a direct interface with the political tier (the elected 
representatives) and who, therefore, works closely with the elected representa-
tives in making decisions around policy choices and provides advice in relation to
those decisions.
• This rationale, this set of objective criteria, was in the Committee’s opinion a
long way away from the notion of a ‘politically sensitive’ post, with all the infer-
ences about party-political allegiance that this provoked. For this reason, and in
order to underscore the point, the Committee proposed that senior appointments
requiring the application of the principle of confidence be named as Strategic
Policy Appointments, and ‘ring-fenced’ accordingly pursuant to written Strategic
Policy Appointments Policy, supported by a Code of Conduct for Strategic Policy
Appointments.
• Evidence that the Committee received from both Exco members and senior
Council officials confirmed that the recent changes of government had caused
uncertainty, instability in the Council’s most senior officials and, to a very large
extent, paralysis. It was felt that a properly constructed policy supported by a code
of conduct that has attracted broad cross-party support would, if implemented
properly, help ensure that there is no repetition in the future.
• While the Committee recognized that the exact number of such strategic
policy appointments would vary from one government to another, it felt that the
positions should be clearly designated as such, in order that candidates for
appointment are aware of the additional considerations that apply and in order that
the rest of the Council staff are also clear in their minds.
• The policy and the code of conduct shall state categorically that appointment
to a strategic policy position does not in any way compromise or dilute the duty of
the official to serve the whole Council, and through the Council, the interests of
all of the citizens and communities of Cape Town. Once appointed, a strategic
policy appointee should implement policy in a non-partisan way.
• It followed from this that Strategic Policy Appointments should not be
exempt from the Council’s overall obligations under the Employment Equity Act
(which embodied affirmative action policy) and its own commitment to diversity
at all levels of the Council Staff. A commitment to the service of all the peoples
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and communities of Cape Town should remain a requirement of all officials of the
Council.
• It was recommended, however, that Strategic Policy Appointments should
receive separate contracts of employment with limited terms, linked to the life of
the existing Council (with a new council having the option of extending this for
up to two months, for purposes of continuity during the transition). The terms and
conditions of the contract shall recognize the limited contractual duration and,
ordinarily, will attract higher remuneration accordingly.
• The Committee was of the view that it is not possible or desirable to suggest a
definitive number of such positions because it will vary from government to
government, depending on the priorities, ideology and mandate of the particular
government. Certain positions, such as the City Manager, his or her deputies, and
the senior communications person(s) would constantly fall in this category, but
others may not. What is a strategically vital position to one government may not
be so for the next. It was also felt that these posts should be limited.
• Finally, it was noted that the recommendations were offered as a package —
Strategic Policy Appointments cannot succeed unless
— there is broad consensus, across parties, of the principles of good govern-
ance that inform the conceptualization of the modified policy;
— that the consensus should, in turn, inform the writing of a detailed policy
based on the propositions outlined earlier; 
— it is supported by a Code of Conduct to govern the conduct of the Strategic
Policy Appointee; and
— with an appropriately re-crafted set of employment contracts for such posi-
tions.
• Accordingly, it was recommended that the Council fully workshop this
report, and its findings and the recommendations proposed, with the whole of
council, in order to build up knowledge, expertise and consensus in the process
and in the policy itself.
This policy was accepted by Exco in June 2001. It also affirmed that the posts
affected by the policy apply to the senior management posts (heads of department
and deputy municipal managers). It also resolved that an effective communication
strategy be put in place to convey this policy to all affected and interested parties.
Conclusion
The heuristic continuum that was developed helped guide the review of Cape
Town’s appointment policy for senior staff. The Committee rejected the compre-
hensive patronage and fused party–state model on the basis that it would lead to
large-scale purging which, in turn, would fundamentally undermine the adminis-
trative capacity of the Council. The medium patronage model was not formally
considered by the Committee, although it was implicitly rejected because of simi-
lar concerns about capacity, albeit primarily at management level. The neutral
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model was explicitly rejected by the Committee because it reflected the naïve
political–administration dichotomy.
The minimalist appointment model was the preferred option of the Committee.
It would enable newly elected councils to choose certain strategic posts, while
ensuring the continuity of the overwhelming majority of local government
employees.
There are also comparative implications of the comparative continuum. It
locates the notion of the neutral official at the one extreme of the continuum
which correctly illustrates the untenability of the politics/administration model.
For countries that still adhere to this model, they run the risk of ignoring the
policy-making powers of officials and the potential of bureaucrats to usurp politi-
cal leadership.
The advantage of the minimalist appointment models in ensuring both strategic
opponents and staff continuity has already been discussed. It is suggested that 
this model has utility in local governments in both developed and developing
countries. One problem is that even some local governments that use this model
are not open about it and still theoretically at any rate, adhere to this fallacious
notion of the neutral official.
Local governments that use or wish to use the minimalist appointment model
need to be transparent about it. The important point that needs to be made to
career officials is that the overwhelming majority of them would not be affected
by the explicit adoption of this model.
This minimalist appointment model could be useful for countries wishing to
move away from patronage or fused party–state models towards a more pro-
fessional local government service but are concerned about the notion of a neutral
and largely autonomous local government service. The fact that senior strategic
positions are appointed by political leadership could make this model an attractive
option for such countries.
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